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Abstract
I present arguments in favor of the Uniformity Hypothesis: the hypothesis that discourse can ex-
tend syntax dependencies without conflicting with them. I consider arguments that Uniformity is
violated in certain cases involving quotation, and I argue that the cases presented in the literature
are in fact completely consistent with Uniformity. I report on an analysis of all examples in the
Copenhagen Dependency Treebanks (CDT) involving violations of Uniformity. I argue that they
are in fact all consistent with Uniformity, and conclude that the CDT should be revised to reflect
this.
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1. Introduction
The Copenhagen Dependency Treebanks (CDT) are unusual in that they contain annotation of both
syntactic and discourse structure, using a single dependency graph (Buch-Kromann and Korzen,
2010). Underlying this approach is a strong hypothesis about the relation of syntax and discourse:
namely, that they are subject to uniform well-formedness conditions. In other words, discourse
structure should extend the syntax graph without conflicting with it. Other discourse annotation
projects have not followed this approach: for example, The Penn Discourse Treebank has been
annotated independently of the syntactic annotation of the same texts.
In this paper, I present arguments in favor of the hypothesis that discourse can extend syntax
dependencies without conflicting with them. I call this the Uniformity Hypothesis. While the
design of the CDT was motivated by the Uniformity Hypothesis, the actual annotation practice
has been more flexible, allowing a mechanism for annotating discourse relations in a way that
allows for violations of Uniformity. This flexibility was introduced in response to arguments in
the literature against Uniformity; in particular that of (Dinesh et al., 2005). Here it is argued that
Contrast relations sometimes conflict with syntactic relations when quotation is involved. I argue
that the examples of interest here are in fact consistent with Uniformity, once the semantics of the
Contrast relation is considered in more detail.
This raises the question of whether the flexibility in CDT annotation is ever needed, or whether
its annotation could be made completely consistent with Uniformity. To answer this question, I
report on a systematic analysis of the examples in CDT that have been annotated in violation of
Uniformity. There are three discourse relations having at least 10 occurrences of such violations. I
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argue that, in each case, the annotation can be replaced with one that does not violate Uniformity.
Based on this, I argue that the CDT should be revised to reflect this.
In what follows, I begin with some background on the CDT, focusing on the annotation of syntax
and discourse. Next, I consider the argument of (Dinesh et al., 2005) against Uniformity, arguing
that the relevant examples are in fact consistent with Uniformity. I then turn to an empirical analysis
of the examples in CDT that have been annotated to indicate a violation of Uniformity. I argue that
all these cases are in fact best analyzed in a way that is consistent with Uniformity, and conclude
that the CDT annotations should be modified to conform with Uniformity in all cases.
1.1 Background
The Copenhagen Dependency Treebanks, CDT, consist of five parallel open-source treebanks for
Danish, English, German, Italian, and Spanish. The treebanks are being annotated manually with
respect to syntax, discourse, anaphora, morphology, as well as translational equivalence (word align-
ment) between the Danish source text and the target texts in the four other languages. At this point
it is primarily the Danish treebank that has been annotated for both discourse and syntax, so in this
paper I will restrict attention to this treebank.
1.2 Syntax
The syntactic annotation of the CDT treebanks is based on the linguistic principles outlined in
the dependency theory Discontinuous Grammar (Buch-Kromann, 2006) and the syntactic annota-
tion principles described in (Kromann, 2003), (Buch-Kromann et al., 2007), and (Buch-Kromann
et al., 2009). All linguistic relations are represented as directed labelled relations between words or
morphemes. The model operates with a primary dependency tree structure in which each word or
morpheme is assumed to act as a complement or adjunct to another word or morpheme, called the
governor (or head), except for the top node of the clause or unit, typically the finite verb.
1.3 Discourse
Just as sentence structure can be captured by dependencies that link up the words and morphemes
within a sentence, discourse structure can also be captured by dependencies that link up the words
within an entire discourse. The CDT discourse annotation consists in linking up each clause’s top
node with its nucleus (understood as the unique word within another clause that is deemed to govern
the relation) and labelling the relations between the two nodes. The inventory of discourse relations
in CDT is described in the CDT manual. It borrows heavily from other discourse frameworks,
in particular Rhetorical Structure Theory, RST (Mann and Thompson, 1987; Taboada and Mann,
2006; Carlson, Lynn and Marcu, Daniel and Okurowski, Mary Ellen, 2001) and the Penn Discourse
Treebank, PDTB (Webber, 2004; Dinesh et al., 2005; Prasad et al., 2007, 2008), as well as (Korzen,
2006, 2007), although the inventory had to be extended to accommodate the great variety of text
types in the CDT corpus. The inventory allows relation names to be formed as disjunctions or
conjunctions of simple relation names, to specify multiple relations or ambiguous alternatives. One
of the most important differences between the CDT framework and other discourse frameworks lies
in the way texts are segmented. In particular, CDT uses words as the basic building blocks in the
discourse structure, while most other discourse frameworks use clauses as their atomic discourse
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units, including RST, PDTB, GraphBank (Wolf and Gibson, 2005), and the Potsdam Commentary
Corpus, PCC (Stede, 2004).
2. Uniformity of Syntax and Discourse
According to the hypothesis of Uniformity, the same well-formedness conditions apply to the dis-
course structure as to syntactic structure. In a very real sense CDT does not distinguish between
syntax and discourse, since both discourse and syntax links are part of the same graph. I will fo-
cus on one particular aspect of Uniformity, which is easier to appreciate in terms of relations on
bracketed structures. Consider the following structures S1 and S2
S1= [. . . [A] . . .]
S2= [. . . [B] . . .]
Given these structures, we allow a relation between S1 and S2, but we do not allow crossing
relations involving embedded elements A or B: such as a link from A to B, from S1 to B, or from A
to S2. Consider the following constructed example
(1) John said it was raining. But it was not raining.
Here, we have
S1= [John said [it was raining]]
S2= [But it was not raining]]
where A (embedded within S1) is it was raining. One might be tempted to define a Contrast relation
between A and S2. But Uniformity requires that the relation be between S1 and S2.
3. Quotation: an Apparent Violation of Uniformity
Dinesh et al. (2005) argue that just such violations of Uniformity can be observed in cases involving
quotation. Consider Example 2:
(2) The current distribution arrangement ends in March 1990, although Delmed said it will
continue to provide some supplies of the peritoneal dialysis products to National Medical,
the spokeswoman said. [(12) in (Dinesh et al., 2005)]
S1= [The current distribution arrangement ends in March 1990]
S2= [Delmed says [it will continue to provide some supplies of the peritoneal dialysis products to
National Medical]...]
Here there is an embedded element in S2, which I call B: it will continue to provide some sup-
plies of the peritoneal dialysis products to National Medical. (I ignore the final attribution to the
spokeswoman.) Dinesh et al. argue that the discourse relation of Contrast, signalled by “although”,
does not hold between S1 and S2, but between S1 and the embedded element B. According to Di-
nesh et al.: “although as a discourse connective denies the expectation that the supply of dialysis
products will be discontinued when the distribution arrangement ends. It does not convey the ex-
pectation that Delmed will not say such things”. To evaluate this argument, we must look at the
semantics of Contrast and quotation.
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4. Semantics of Contrast
Dinesh et al. (2005) are assuming that Contrast typically involves a “denial of expectation”. This
is a standard view of Contrast, and the Penn Discourse Treebank Annotation Manual (Prasad et al.,
2007) defines Concession as a subtype of Contrast, characterized by “denial of expectation”, stating
this:
The type Concession applies when the connective indicates that one of the arguments
describes a situation A which causes C, while the other asserts (or implies) not C.
The RST Annotation Manual (Carlson, Lynn and Marcu, Daniel, 2001, p. 50) says this about
Concession as a type of Contrast:
. . . a Concession relation is always characterized by a violated expectation (p 50)
But what exactly is meant by a “violated expectation”? In an influential early discussion,
(Hobbs, 1985, p. 22), defines “Violated Expectation” as follows:
Infer P from the assertion of S0 and ¬ P from the assertion of S1.
Hobbs illustrates this with the following example:
(3) John is a lawyer, but he is honest.
From S1 John is a lawyer, Hobbs argues, one can infer P = John is dishonest, while S2 is not P
(John is honest).
From this discussion, it is clear that Contrast between S1 and S2 normally involves a contra-
diction – S1 implies some P and S2 implies not P. At the same time, a normal, felicitous discourse
must be logically consistent. What this means is that the contradiction in a Contrast must always
be safely “packaged” to avoid an inconsistent discourse. A standard way of achieving this is that
inferences from S0 to P and from S1 to not P are based on different background assumptions, which
I will call Back1 and Back2. A felicitous discourse does not require that one be committed to the
truth of Back1 and Back2, but, rather, one must be willing to temporarily entertain them.
We now return to Example 2. Recall that S1 = [current distribution arrangement ends], and S2
= [Delmed says some supplies will continue], with B = [some supplies will continue]. Dinesh et
al. argue for Contrast between S1 and B: I will call this Case 1. Uniformity would dictate Contrast
between S1 and S2, which I will call Case 2.
Following Hobbs’ analysis, we want to identify some P that we can infer from S1, such that not
P can be inferred from B (in Case 1) or from S2 (in Case 2). It is crucial that these two inferences rest
on different background assumptions; otherwise the discourse would be inconsistent. Furthermore,
a discourse is only felicitous if the background assumptions are salient and one is willing to entertain
the possibility that they are true. I call the background assumptions underlying the inference to P
and not P Back1 and Back2, respectively.
In Case 1, the background assumption for inferring P, Back1, is this: supplies only come from
current distribution arrangement. Together with S1, current distribution ends, one can infer P: no
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supplies will continue. The background assumption for inferring not P, Back2, is empty, since not
P is identical to B. Thus, I agree with Dinesh et al. that Contrast between S1 and B is coherent.
However, Case 2 also supports Contrast. Here, we have S2 Delmed says some supplies will continue
instead of B some supplies will continue. Instead of an empty background assumption Back2, we
have Delmed speaks truthfully. From Back2 and S2 one can infer not P. The two cases are shown
below:
Case 1: Contrast S1,B
• Back1: supplies only come from current distribution arrangement
• S1: current distribution ends
• P: no supplies will continue
• Back2: <empty>
• B: some supplies will continue
• not P: some supplies will continue
Case 2: Contrast S1,S2
• Back1: supplies only come from current distribution arrangement
• S1: current distribution ends
• P: no supplies will continue
• Back2: Delmed speaks truthfully
• S2: Delmed says some supplies will continue
• not P: some supplies will continue
I have argued that Example 2 is in fact consistent with the uniformity hypothesis – A discourse
relation of Contrast between the top-level constituents S1 and S2 is consistent with the notion that
Contrast always requires conflicting material to be properly “packaged”, and quotations are one
typical means for doing so.
Now, while the annotation approach in the CDT was originally motivated in part by the Unifor-
mity Hypothesis, the actual annotation policy has been more flexible, incorporating a special Star
notation for the express purpose of indicating the kinds of violations of Uniformity being discussed
here. I have attempted to show that this argument is not convincing. There could of course be other
cases in which Uniformity must be violated. Indeed, there are 135 examples in the CDT in which




Relation Total Occurrences Occurrences with * Percentage
CONJUNCTION 1938 76 3.921
CONTR 195 15 7.692
AGENTIVE 156 11 7.692
CONC 107 7 6.542
CONST 109 7 6.422
FORMAL 91 6 6.593
TELIC 150 6 4.000
TIME 64 3 4.687
EXPR 17 2 11.76
QUEST 48 2 4.166
Table 1: Occurrences of Star Notation in CDT
5. An Empirical Analysis of Uniformity in CDT
5.1 Use of the Star Notation in CDT
In CDT a relation can be written with a * either to the left or right (or both), to indicate that the left
or right argument is embedded. Consider relation R linking S0 and S1, where
S0= [ . . . [A] . . . ] and
S1= [ . . . [B] . . . ]
If we have *R[S0,S1], this is a way of indicating R[A,S1], while R*[S0,S1] indicates R[S0,B].
In all cases I have observed, the embedded element referred to with the Star notation is quoted
material. By quoted material, I mean to include both indirect and direct quotes, including sentential
complements not only of verbs of saying but also verbs of belief. Thus I include John said “it is
raining”, John said that it is raining and John thinks that it is raining. In all three cases I call it is
raining the quoted material.
Table 1 gives the relations with which the Star notation occurs. Below I consider in detail the
relations Contrast, Agentive, and Conjunction. The remaining relations have very small numbers
of occurrences. I begin with a detailed consideration of Contrast, since it relates directly to the
argument discussed above, which motivated the Star notation.
5.2 Contrast
I begin with Contrast. For each example, there are two top-level clauses, S1 and S2, and in each
case the “*” notation has been used to indicate a Contrast relation where one of the arguments is
embedded. Either S1 or S2 (or both) contains an embedded element, which is the complement of
a saying verb. This gives rise to three possibilities. Table 2 gives the distribution of the Contrast
examples with respect to these three possible categories.
For Category 1, recall Example 2. There, the argument was that Contrast was valid between
S1 and S2, based on a background assumption that Delmed speaks truthfully. This argument can
be made for all three categories. Assume that A = S1 or is embedded within S1, and B = S2 or is
embedded within S2. In each case, the embedded element is the complement of “X SAYS”. If there
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Category S1 S2 Occurrences (File Id’s) Count
1 X SAYS A B 688, 1182, 840, 465, 729, 138 6
2 A X SAYS B 0005, 0366, 0654, 0986,
0683, 1251, 1014, 1214, 1527
9
3 X SAYS A X SAYS B 0
Table 2: Occurrences of Star Notation with Contrast
is a Contrast relation between A and B, then, under the assumption that X is truthful, there must
also be a Contrast relation between S1 and S2.1
Below I consider an example of each category.
There are six examples in CDT in Category 1 “X SAYS A; B”. Consider this example (file
0688):
S1: [Administrerende direktør Peter Christoffersen siger, at [der hverken er forhandlinger eller
sonderinger mellem Baltica og Skandia i øjeblikket].]
[CEO Peter Christoffersen says that [there are neither negotiations or explorations between
Baltica and Skandia at the moment.].]
S2: [Skandia har tidligere ønsket et gifterma˚l med Baltica.]
[Skandia had earlier wanted an alliance with Baltica.]
Simplifying a bit, we have A = there are no negotiations and S2 = Skandia had wanted an
alliance.
The reasoning is directly parallel to that of Example 2: there is a “Violated Expectation” between
A and S2 – in this case S2 (that an alliance was desired) sets up an expectation that there would be
negotiations, and A violates that expectation. This is the Contrast relation annotated using the Star
notation, indicating a relation between the embedded A with the top-level S2. However, under the
assumption that the speaker, Peter Christoffersen, is truthful, then S1 can be inferred to violate the
expectation just as A does.
Recall that Category 2 is “A; X SAYS B”. We have this example (file 0986):
S1= [De europæiske sta˚lfabrikker befinder sig midt i den værste nedgang i ti a˚r, uden udsigt til
forbedring i a˚r. ]
[The European steel factories find themselves in the midsts of the worst downturn in ten years,
with no prospects of improvement this year.]
S2= [[Men det er tid til at købe aktier i sta˚lindustrien], siger erhvervsanalytikere.]
[[But this is the time to buy stock in the steel industry], say business analysts.]
The annotator found a contrast between S1 and B; since S1 describes a downturn in the steel
industry, one could infer that this is not the time to buy stock in steel, while B expresses the opposite.
1. As an anonymous reviewer points out, Contrast does not always involve a denial of expectation; it can also involve
a “juxtaposition of viewpoints” where two or more arguments of a given relation differ. It is worth mentioning that
the Penn Discourse Treebank annotates two subtypes of Contrast, called juxtaposition and opposition. The logic
of my argument concerning Contrast has been limited to cases involving denial of expectation. It is possible that
this argument would not apply to examples involving these other types of Contrast, which would then support the
argument that Uniformity cannot be maintained. No such cases of Contrast were found in the CDT however.
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Category S1 S2 Occurrences (File Id’s) Count
1 X SAYS A B 0366, 1173, 0538, 1035 4
2 A X SAYS B 0581, 0705, 0465, 1173, 0065, 1259 6
3 X SAYS A X SAYS B 0001 1
Table 3: Occurrences of Star Notation with Agentive
Under the assumption that what business analysts say is true, there is also a contrast between S1 and
S2.
5.3 Agentive (Cause/Reason)
The discourse relation Agentive in CDT is meant to indicate that one clause expresses a cause or
reason for another clause. Table 3 gives the occurrences of the Star notation in connective with
Agentive.
I begin with an example from Category 1 “X SAYS A; B” (file 1173):
S1 = [[“Jeg respekterer virkelig Orlando,”] siger Michela Buscemi. ]
[[“I really respect Orlando,”] says Michela Buscemi. ]
S1a= [To af hendes brødre er blevet dræbt af mafiaen, og hun vidnede i retten mod de mistænkte
drabsmænd. ]
[Two of her brothers were killed by the Mafia, and she testified in court against the suspected
killers.]
S2= [“Han var den eneste, der rakte en ha˚nd frem for at hjælpe mig.”]
[“He was the only one who came forward to help me.”]
Here we have A = “I really respect Orlando”, and B = “He was the only one who came forward
to help me”.
(Note that the Agentive relation skips over the intervening sentence which I call here S1a.)
Clearly in the reported discourse, the speaker Michela Buscemi is offering B as reason for A. How-
ever, in the discourse of the text, I argue that the writer is offering S2 as a reason for S1: that is, the
fact that the speaker says she respects Orlando is explained by the fact that the speaker has a belief
about him, namely that he helped her. It is perfectly coherent to see B (Orlando helped Buscemi)
as a reason for A (Buscemi respects Orlando), but it is equally coherent to see S2 (Buscemi says
Orlando helped her) as a reason for A. This latter view, I argue, is the correct view of the text, and
this is what Uniformity would suggest.
More generally, the reasoning is parallel to that with Contrast: given that X is truthful, then if
there is an Agentive relation between S1 and B there is also an Agentive relation between S1 and
S2.
Category 2 “A; X SAYS B” (file 1259):
S1= [Og i hvert fald kan vi ikke ma˚le kvaliteten af vore dages barndom ud fra de normer, der
gjaldt dengang, vi selv var børn.]
[And in any case, we can’t measure the quality of today’s childhood based on the norms that
were relevant when we were children.]
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Category S1 S2 Count
1 X SAYS A B 32
2 A X SAYS B 30
3 X SAYS A X SAYS B 12
Table 4: Occurrences of Star Notation with Conjunction
S2= [[”Børns vilka˚r har ændret sig sa˚ meget de seneste a˚r, at vi faktisk ikke har noget sammen-
ligningsgrundlag,”] siger han.]
[[“The conditions of children have changed so much in recent years, that we actually don’t have
a basis for comparison,”] he said.]
Here we have S1 = And in any case, we can’t measure the quality . . . , and B = “The conditions
of children have changed so much . . . ”.
It may well be that the quoted speaker is offering B as a reason for S1. This is presumably why
the annotator used the Right-Star notation to indicate B as the second argument for the Agentive
relation. But it is equally reasonable to argue that the writer is offering S2 as a reason for S1. Just
as in previous examples: if the speaker is willing to entertain the assumption that X is truthful, then
the fact that B is a reason for A means that X SAYS B is a reason for A.
Category 3
X SAYS A; X SAYS B
S1= [De hævder, at [Ruslands vej til demokrati ga˚r gennem diktatur.]]
[They claim that [Russia’s path to democracy goes through dictatorship.]]
S2= [ I en af deres artikler hedder det: [ ”I et autoritært regime lagdel samfundet og forskellige
interesser modnes.]]
[In one of their articles, it is stated: [“In an authoritarian regime, society is stratified and different
interests matured.”]]
Here the annotator used both a left and right Star, indicating an Agentive relation between A and
B. The statement in B, In an authoritarian regime, . . . provides an explanation for A, that Russia’s
path to democracy goes through dictatorship. But this also supports an Agentive relation between
S1 and S2: the author of the text is offering S2 as a reason for S1. That is, the reason the speakers
(they) make the claim A, is that they have the beliefs B.
5.4 Conjunction
Table 4 shows the distribution of Star-notated Conjunction relations with respect to the different
categories.
Because of the large number of Conjunction occurrences with the Star notation, I do not list
the specific file id’s, as I did with Agentive and Contrast. Furthermore, Conjunction does not place
specific semantic demands on its arguments in the way that Contrast and Agentive does. The general
argument concerning Conjunction is the same: assume A is S1 or embedded within S1, and B is
S2 or embedded within S2. If Conjunction holds between A and B, then assuming X is truthful,
Conjunction must hold between S1 and S2.
The following is an example from Category 1, “X SAYS A, B” (file 1259):
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S1= [[-Jeg har taget noget tøj med til Camilla,] forklarede Bjørn, da de var kommet ind i stuen.
]
[[-I have brought some clothes for Camilla,] explained Bjørn, when they had come into the
living room. ]
S2= [-Du kan bare hente noget mere, hvis der ikke er nok.]
[-You can just get some more, if there is not enough.]
We have A = I have brought some clothes for Camilla and B = -You can just get some more,
if there is not enough.]. The dashes are meant to indicate direct quotations. So it is implicit that
the speaker of S1, Bjørn, is also the speaker of S2. Thus S2 could be preceded with And Bjørn
continued: without change to the meaning. The felicity of the connective and supports my claim
that the Conjunction relation need not apply to the embedded A, but can relate the top level clauses
S1 and S2.
6. Discussion
The CDT was originally formulated in accordance with Uniformity; subsequently, the Star notation
was added because it was felt that it was necessary to violate Uniformity in certain cases. In this
paper, I have argued that this is not the case. There are three relations with at least ten occurrences of
the Star notation in CDT: Contrast, Agentive and Conjunction.2 For Contrast and Agentive, I have
made a general argument that quotations always involve a temporary assumption that the speaker
is truthful and therefore the semantic relation attributed to the speaker will also be attributable to
the writer. Because of this I argued that quotations involving Contrast or Agentive do not require a
violation of Uniformity, based on an examination of all the relevant examples. The general argument
involving Conjunction is similar, and furthermore Conjunction places rather weak requirements
on its two arguments. Based on these arguments, I have argued that Uniformity can indeed be
maintained in CDT.
I have not attempted to argue that these notations are better than those which violate Uniformity.
For example, an anonymous reviewer points to the following pattern: John says X but John says Y,
where it might well be that the fundamental contrast is between X and Y – that is, annotating a
Contrast relation between X and Y might intuitively be the best choice. I do not deny that this might
well be the case – I have merely attempted to show that it is possible to rule out such annotations
and still be able to find acceptable annotations for all the data of the Danish portion of the CDT.
7. Conclusion
While most treebank work has focused on syntax, there is a growing interest in treebanks that
involve annotation of discourse structure. The CDT is unusual in that discourse structure is treated
as an extension of syntax, with an underlying assumption of Uniformity – that discourse and syntax
can be annotated as part of single well-formed graph. Other major discourse treebank projects
have not followed this approach, instead annotating discourse independently of syntax, reflecting
2. There is no reason to assume that apparent Uniformity violations are confined to these three relations. For example,
an anonymous reviewer points out that the PDTB contains apparent Uniformity violations with a variety of other




a widespread view that Uniformity cannot be maintained, and the CDT was recently modified to
allow violations of Uniformity.
In this paper I have shown that the data of the CDT can in fact be annotated consistently with
Uniformity, and I have concluded that the CDT can and should be modified to remove all conflicts
between discourse and syntax. In future work, I intend to investigate larger discourse treebanks such
as the Penn Discourse Treebank to further investigate the possibility of maintaining Uniformity.
This is less straightforward than the current investigation, since the deviations from Uniformity are
not explicitly marked in the Penn Discourse Treebank, but it will provide a much richer empirical
basis for exploring the hypothesis of Uniformity.
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